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Abstract. Substantial evidence has accumulated in recent empirical works on the limited ability of the 
Nash equilibrium to rationalize observed behavior in many classes of games played by experimental 
subjects. This realization has led to several attempts aimed at finding tractable equilibrium concepts 
which perform better empirically, often by introducing a reference point to which players compare the 
available payoff allocations, as in impulse balance equilibrium and in the inequity aversion model. The 
first part of this paper is concerned with reviewing the recent reference point literature and advancing a 
new, empirically sound, hybrid concept. In the second part, evolutionary game theoretic models are 
employed to investigate the role played by fairness motives as well as spatial structure in explaining the 
evolution of cooperative behavior. 
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Part I.  Incorporating fairness motives into the Impulse Balance Equilibrium  and 
Quantal Response Equilibrium concepts: an application to experimental 2X2 games 
 
From efficiency to equality: the “distributive” reference point  
 
In recent years experimental economists have accumulated considerable evidence that steadily 
contradicts the self-interest hypothesis embedded in equilibrium concepts traditionally studied in 
game theory, such as Nash’s. The evidence suggests that restricting the focus of analysis to the 
strategic interactions among perfectly rational players (exhibiting equilibrium behavior) can be 
limiting, and that 
considerations about fairness and reciprocity should be accounted for.  
In fact, while models based on the assumption that people are exclusively motivated by their 
material self-interest perform well for competitive markets with standardized goods, misleading 
predictions arise when applied to non-competitive environments, for example those characterized 
by a small number of players (cf. FEHR & SCHMIDT, 2000) or other frictions. For example 
KAHNEMAN, KNETSCH & THALER (1986) find empirical results indicating that customers are 
extremely sensitive to the fairness of firms’ short-run pricing decisions, which might explain the 
fact that some firms do not fully exploit their monopoly power. 
 
One prolific strand of literature on equity issues focuses on relative measures, in the sense that 
subjects are concerned not only with the absolute amount of money they receive but also about their 
relative standing compared to others. BOLTON (1991), formalized the relative income hypothesis 
in the context of an experimental bargaining game between two players. 
KIRCHSTEIGER (1994) followed a similar approach by postulating envious behavior. Both 
specify the utility function in such a way that agent i suffers if she gets less than player j, but she’s 
indifferent with respect to j’s payoff if she is better off herself. The downside of the latter 
specifications is that, while consistent with the behavior in bargaining games, they fall short of 
explaining observed behavior such as voluntary contributions in public good games.  
 
A more general approach has been followed by FEHR & SCHMIDT (1999), who instead of 
assuming that utility is either monotonically increasing or decreasing in the well being of other 
player, model fairness as self-centered inequality aversion. Based on this interpretation, subjects 
resist inequitable outcomes, that is they are willing to give up some payoff in order to move in the 
direction of more equitable outcomes. More specifically, a player is altruistic towards other players 
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if their material payoffs are below an equitable benchmark, but feels envy when the material 
payoffs of the other players exceed this level. To capture this idea, the authors consider a utility 
function which is linear in both inequality aversion and in the payoffs. Formally, for the two-player 
case ሺ݅  
 
൛࢞
        
Where  are player 1 and player 2’s payoffs respectively and ߚ  are player i’s inequality 
parameters satisfying the following conditions: ߚ  and  0 . 
The second term in the equation is the utility loss from disadvantageous inequality, while the third 
term is the utility loss from advantageous inequality. Due to the above restrictions imposed on the 
parameters, for a given payoff ݔ , player i’s utility function is maximized at ݔ , and the utility 
loss from disadvantageous inequality (ݔ ) is larger than the utility loss if player i is better off 
than player j (ݔ ). 
 
Fehr and Schmidt show that the interaction of the distribution of types with the strategic 
environment explains why in some situations very unequal outcomes are obtained while in other 
situations very egalitarian outcomes prevail. In referring to the social aspects introduced by this 
utility function, one could think of inequality aversion in terms of an interactive framing effect 
(reference point dependence).  
 
This payoff modification has proved successful in many applications, mainly in combination with 
the Nash equilibrium concept, and will therefore be employed in this study, although in conjunction 
with a different equilibrium type, as will be explained in the next section. 
 
The “psychological” reference point 
 
The predictive weakness of the Nash equilibrium is effectively pointed out by EREV & ROTH 
(1998), who study the robustness and predictive power of learning  models in experiments 
involving at least 100 periods of games with a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies. They 
conclude that “…in some of the games the [Nash] equilibrium prediction does very badly” and that 
a simple learning model can be used to predict, as well as explain, observed behavior on a broad 
range of games, without fitting parameters to each game. A similar approach, based ex-post and ex-
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ante comparisons of the mean square deviations, will also be employed in this paper to assess to 
what extent the proposed hybrid model improves the fit of several games. 
 
Based on the observation of the shortcomings of mixed Nash equilibrium in rationalizing observed 
behavior in many classes of games played by experimental subjects, an alternative tractable 
equilibrium has been suggested by SELTEN & CHMURA (forthcoming). IBE is based on learning 
direction theory (SELTEN & BUCHTA, 1999), which is applicable to the repeated choice of the 
same parameter in learning situations where the decision maker receives feedback not only about 
the payoff for the choice taken, but also for the payoffs connected to alternative actions. If a higher 
parameter would have brought a higher payoff, the player receives an upward impulse, while if a 
lower parameter would have yielded a higher payoff, a downward impulse is received. The decision 
maker is assumed to have a tendency to move in the direction of the impulse. IBE, a stationary 
concept which is based on transformed payoff matrices as explained in the next section, applies this 
mechanism to 2x2 games. The probability of choosing one of two strategies (for example Up) is 
treated as the parameter, which can be adjusted upward or downward. It is assumed that the second 
lowest payoff in the matrix is an aspiration level determining what is perceived as profit or loss. In 
impulse balance equilibrium expected upward and downward impulses are equal for each of both 
players simultaneously. 
 
The main result of the paper by Selten and Chmura is that, for the games they consider, impulse 
balance theory has a greater predictive success than the other three stationary concepts they 
compare it to: Nash equilibrium, sample-7 equilibrium and quantal response equilibrium. While 
having the desirable feature of being a parameter-free concept as the Nash equilibrium, and of 
outperforming the latter, the aspiration level framework (to be described) expose the theory to a 
critique regarding the use of transformed payoffs in place of the original ones for the computation 
of the equilibrium.  
 
The aspiration level can be thought of as a psychological reference point, as opposed to the social 
one considered when modeling inequality aversion: the idea behind the present work is that of 
utilizing IBE but replacing the aspiration level with inequity aversion (social) parameters. The 
motivation follows from the realization that in non-constant sum games (considered here) subjects’ 
behavior also reflects considerations of equity. In fact, while finite repetition does little to enlarge 
the scope for cooperation or retaliation, non-constant sum games offer some cooperation 
opportunities, and it seems plausible that fairness motives will play an important role in repeated 
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play of this class of games. A suitable consequence of replacing the aspiration level framework with 
the inequality aversion one is that the original payoffs can be utilized (and should, in order to avoid 
mixing social and psychological reference points). 
 
Experimental setup: IBE 
 
The table in Appendix A shows the 12 games, 6 constant sum games and 6 non-constant sum games 
on which Selten and Chmura have run experiments, which have taken place with 12 independent 
subject groups for each constant sum game and with 6 independent subject groups for each non-
constant sum game. Each independent subject group consists of 4 players 1 and 4 players 2 
interacting anonymously in fixed roles over 200 periods with random matching. In summary: 
 
Players: I={1,2} 
Action space: {U,D}x{L,R} 
Probabilities in mixed strategy: {ܲ ,1-ܲ } and {ܳ ,1-ܳ } 
Sample size: (54 sessions) x (16 subjects) = 864 
Time periods: T=200   
 
 In Appendix A, a non-constant sum game next to a constant sum game has the same best reply 
structure (characterized by the Nash equilibrium choice probabilities ܲ ) and is derived from the 
paired constant sum game by adding the same constant to player 1’s payoff in the column for R and 
2’s payoff in the row for U. Games identified by a smaller number have more extreme parameter 
values than games identifies by a higher number; for example, Game 1 and its paired non-constant 
sum Game 7 are near the border of the parameter space (ܲ 0.1   and ܳ 0.9), while Game 6 and 
its paired non-constant sum Game 12 are near the middle of the parameter space (ܲ  and 
=0.6).  
 
As pointed out, IBE involves a transition from the original game to the transformed game, in which 
losses with respect to the natural aspiration level get twice the weight as gains above this level. The 
impulse balance equilibrium depends on the best reply structure of this modified game, which is 
generally different from that of the original game, resulting therefore in different predictions for the 
games in a pair. 
The present paper utilizes the data on the experiments involving 6 independent subject groups for 
each of the 6 non-constant sum games (games 7 through 12 in Appendix A). As anticipated above, 
this class of games is particularly conceptually suitable to the application of the inequality aversion 
framework. Further, in completely mixed 2x2 games, mixed equilibrium is the unambiguous game 
theoretic prediction when they are played as non-cooperative one-shot games. Since non-constant 
sum games provide incentives for cooperation, such attempts to cooperation may have influenced 
the observed relative frequencies in Selten’s experiment. Along these lines, it is particularly 
relevant to see whether inequality aversion payoff modifications can help improve the fit with 
respect to these frequencies.       
 
The application of inequality aversion parameters to Impulse balance equilibrium provides an 
opportunity for testing Fehr & Schmidt’s fairness model in conjunction with the IBE, which  is 
itself a simple yet fascinating concept which has proven to be empirically successful in fitting the 
data in many categories of games and is nevertheless parsimonious due to the straight-forward 
formulation and parameter-free nature. By including a fairness dimension to it, the hope is to supply 
favorable empirical evidence and provide further stimulus to expand the types of games empirically 
tested. 
 
Formally, this involves first modifying the payoff matrices of each game in order to account for the 
inequality parameters ( β ,α ), than creating the impulse matrix based on which the probabilities are 
computed. In order to clarify the difference between the reference point utilized in Selten and 
Chmura (the aspiration level) and that utilized in this paper it is useful to start by summarizing the 
mechanics behind the computation of the IBE.  
 
Let’s consider the normal form game depicted in Figure 1 below, 
 
 
Fig.1: structure of the 2x2 games (arrows point in the direction of best replies) 
 
      L (ܳ ) ? R (1-ܳ௅) ௅
ܽ௅ ௅  ௎ ܽோ ௎ ௎ +  ܿ  ;  ܾ  
↑ 
  ;  ܾ + ݀      
                     ↓ 
ܽ௅ ஽  ஽ ܽோ ோ ஽  ;  ܾ + ݀    + ܿ   ;  ܾ  
? 
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where ܽ௅, ܽோ, ܾ௎, ܾ஽ ൒ 0 and  ܿ௅, ܿோ, ݀௎, ݀஽ ൐ 0  
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ܿோ are player 1’s payoffs in favor of U, e ݀௎, ݀஽ are player 2’s payoffs in favour of 
L,R  one o
, ܾ஽. 
the transforme player i’s payoff unchanged if it is less or 
 x ≤ ݏ௜ => x’= x 
½(x-ݏ௜) 
 after the play, player i could have obtained a higher payoff with the other strategy, she receives an 
ig.2:Impulses in T.G. in the direction of unselected strategy        
 
ܿ௅  and D whil
 respectively. Note that player 1 can secure the higher f ܽ௅, ܽோ by choosing one of his pure 
strategies, and player 2 can similarly secure the higher one of ܾ௎ Therefore, the authors define 
the natural aspiration levels for the 2 players are given by: 
ݏ௜ =max(ܽ௅, ܽோ)   for i=1   and  ݏ௜=max(ܾ௎, ܾ஽ሻ for i=2 
d game (TG) is constructed by leaving 
equal to ݏ௜ and by reducing the difference of payoffs greater than si by the factor ½. Algebraically, 
calling x the payoffs, 
 
if
if x > ݏ௜ => x’= x-
 
If
impulse in the direction of the other strategy, of the size of the foregone payoff in the TG.  
 
 
F
 
      L (ܳ௅)  R (1-ܳ௅) 
0 ; ݀௎* ܿோ* ; 0 
ܿ௅* ; 0 0 ; ݀஽* 
 
 
he concept of impulse balance equilibrium requires that player 1’s expected impulse from U to D 
௎ܳோܿோ* = ஽ܲܳ௅ܿ௅* 
௎ܲܳ௅݀௎ ஽ܳோ݀஽              
 
hich, after some manipulation, can be shown to lead to the following formulae for probabilities: 
T
is equal to the expected impulse from D to U; likewise, pl.2’s expected impulse from L to R must 
equal the impulse from R to L. Formally, 
 
ܲ
*=ܲ * 
W
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Experimental setup: equity-driven Impulse Balance Equilibrium 
 
Replacing the aspiration level framework with the inequality aversion one doesn’t require the 
computation of the TG based on aspiration level framing, as the original payoffs are now modified 
by including the inequality parameters ( β ,α ). Formally, recalling that: ࣯௜ ൌ ݔ௜ െ ߙ௜݉ܽݔ൛ݔ௝ െ
ݔ݅,0െߚ݅݉ܽݔݔ݅െݔ݆,0 
௅
ܽ௅  ௅   െ ߙ௜݉ܽݔሼܾ௎ െ ܽ௅ െ ܿ௅ , 0ሽ െ ߚ௜݉ܽݔሼܽ௅  ൅ ܿ௅ െ ܾ௎, 0ሽ
ܾ௎ െ ߙ௝݉ܽݔሼܽ௅  ൅  ܿ௅   െ ܾ௎, 0ሽ െ ߚ௝݉ܽݔሼܾ௎ െ ܽ௅ െ ܿ௅  , 0
ܽோ െ ߙ௜݉ܽݔሼܾ௎ ൅ ݀௎ െ ܽோ, 0ሽ െ ߚ௜݉ܽݔ൛ܽோ െ ܾ௎ െ ݀௎ , 0
ܾ௎ ௎ െ ߙ௝݉ܽݔሼܽோ െ ܾ௎ െ ݀௎, 0ሽ െ ߚ௝݉ܽݔሼܾ௎ ൅ ݀௎ െ ܽோ, 0ሽ
 
Table 1: structure of the 2x2 games accounting for inequality aversion 
      L (ܳ )       R (1-ܳ௅) 
+  ܿ ;
ሽ 
ൟ ;  
+ ݀        
                      
ܽ௅ െ ߙ௜݉ܽݔሼܾ஽  ൅ ݀஽   െ ܽ௅, 0ሽ െ ߚ௜݉ܽݔሼെܾ஽ െ ݀஽ ൅ ܽ௅, 0ሽ
ܾ஽ ൅ ݀஽ െ ߙ௝݉ܽݔ൛ܽ௅ െ ܾ஽ െ ݀஽௅, 0ൟ െ ߚ௝݉ܽݔሼെܾ஽ െ ݀஽ ൅ ܽ௅, 0ሽ
ோ ோ െ ߙ௜݉ܽݔሼܾ஽ െ ܽோ െ ܿோ  , 0ሽ െ ߚ௜݉ܽݔሼܽோ ൅ ܿோ െ ܾ஽, 0
ܾ஽ െ ߙ௝݉ܽݔሼܽோ ൅ ܿோ   െ ܾ஽, 0ሽ െ ߚ௝݉ܽݔ൛ܾ஽ െ ܽோ െ ܿோ,   , 0
  ;  
 
ܽ + ܿ ሽ; 
ൟ 
 
Based on these payoffs, the previous section’s computations can be conducted in order to find the 
impulse balance mixed strategy equilibria corresponding to specific values of β  andα . 
 
Two measures of the relative performance of the I.A.-adjusted Impulse Balance concept:   
best fit and predictive power 
 
Results in terms of Best fit 
 
The preceding analysis served as an introduction to the more systemic method utilized in the next 
paragraphs to assess the descriptive and predictive success of the “pure” impulse balance 
equilibrium in comparison to the proposed Inequality Aversion hybrid.  
Following a methodology which has been broadly utilized in the literature to measure the adaptive 
and predictive success of a point in a Euclidean space, the squared distance of observed and 
theoretical values is employed (cf. Erev & Roth, 1998 and Selten & Chmura). More precisely, the 
first part of the analysis consists, for each of the 6 non constant sum games, of a grid search with an 
MSD criterion on the ( β ,α ) parameter space to estimate the best fitting parameters, i.e. those that 
minimize the distance between the model and the data.  
Algebraically, the mean over the 6 games in the best fit row will be given by:  
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The inequality aversion parameters used in the hybrid model must satisfy the constraints ii αβ ≤
and 0 1≤i≤ β . The r evant parameter space under investigation is then given, for each el β ,by values 
α ∈[ β ,0.5]. Graphically the parameter space can be represented as follows are as follows:  
 
and α  β  Figure 3: The correspondence between 
 
 
 Table 1, a summary of the results of the explanatory power of the two models is presented for 
he reason of the two-fold comparison is that not only it is meaningful to assess whether the hybrid 
׊ β א ሾ0,0.35ሿ , α א ሾ β , 0.5ሿ 
 
   
 
In
each non constant sum game, starting from the transformed or the original payoffs, respectively. 
The comparisons are made both within game class in column 5 (e.g. within transformed game i, 
i=7,...,12), and across game class in the last column (e.g. between original game i and transformed 
game i).  
 
T
model can better approximate the observed frequencies than the I.B. concept, but it is especially 
important to answer the question: does the hybrid concept applied to the original payoffs of game i 
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able 2: Ex-post (best fit) descriptive power of hybrid model vs I.B. equilibrium  
outperform the ‘pure’ I.B. applied to the transformed payoffs? In other words, since the inequality 
aversion concept overlaps to a certain extent to that of having impulses in the direction of the 
strategy not chosen, applying the inequality aversion adjustment to payoffs that have already been 
transformed to account for the aspiration level will result in “double counting”. It is therefore more 
relevant to compare the best fit of  hybrid equilibrium on O.G. (see rows highlighted in blue)  to 
that obtained by applying impulse balance equilibrium to T.G.  
 
T
 
 
FREQUENCY 
 [fu; fl] 
N.E. 
[Pu;Ql]   
BEST FIT  I.B.+I.A. 
 [Pu;Ql]  
 ( β ,α ) 
IBE 
[Pu;Ql]   
 (0;0) 
I.B.+I.A 
ê  
IBE? 
O.G.+I.B.+I.A.
ê 
T.G.+IBE? 
TG7 [.141;.564]    (0;0)  634][.104;.634] [.104;. NO 
 
n.a. 
OG7 [.141;.564] [.091;.909]  [.099;.568] (.054;.055) 
  
[.091;.500] YES YES 
TG8 [.250;.586]   (.043;.065) [.258;.561] YES n.a. [.270;.586]
  
OG8 [.250;.586] [.182;.727]  [.257;.585] (.006;.468) 
 
[.224;.435] YES YES 
TG9 [.254;.827]  180;.827] (.07;.10) [.188;.764] YES n.a. [.
 
OG9 [.254;.827] [.273;.909] [.232;.840] (.325;.327)  [.162;.659] YES 
 
YES 
TG10 [.366;.699]  [.355;.759] (.089;.134)  [.304;.724] ES n.a. 
 
Y
OG10 [.366;.699] [.364;.818]  [.348;.717] (.250;.254)  
 
[.263;.616] YES YES 
TG11 [.311;.652]  357;.652] (.012;.018)  [.354;.646] YES n.a. [.
 
OG11 [.311;.652] [.364;.727]  [.344;.644] (.001;.425)  
 
[.316;.552] YES YES 
TG12 [.439;.604]  496;0.575]  (0;0) [.496;.575] NO n.a. [.
  
OG12 [.439;.604] [.455;.636]  [.439;.604] (.022;.393) 
 
[.408;.547] YES YES 
 
spection of Table 1 suggests a strong positive answer to the following two relevant questions In
regarding the ability of the proposed concept to fit the observed frequencies of play: within the 
same class of payoffs (TG or OG), is the descriptive power of the hybrid concept superior to that of 
the IBE? And, perhaps more importantly, is this still true when the two concepts are applied to their 
natural payoffs, namely the original and the transformed respectively? 
The last two columns of Table 1 contain the answers to the two questions, based on a comparison of 
the mean squared deviations of the predicted probabilities from the observed frequencies under the 
two methods.    
 
Results in terms of Predictive power 
 
The next step in evaluating the performance of the inequality aversion-adjusted impulse balance 
equilibrium concept is studying its ex ante predictive power. This is done by partitioning the data 
into subsets, and simulating each experiment using parameters estimated from the other 
experiments. By generating the MSD statistic repeatedly on the data set leaving one data value out 
each time, a mean estimate is found making it possible to evaluate the predictive power of the 
model. In other words, the behavior in each of the 6 non-constant sum games is predicted without 
using that game’s data, but using the data of the other 5 games to estimate the probabilities of 
playing up and down. By this cross-prediction technique (known as jackknifing), one can evaluate 
the stability of the parameter estimates, which shouldn’t be substantially affected by the removal of 
any one game from the sample. Erev & Roth (1998) based their conclusions on the predictive 
success and stability of their learning models by means of this procedure, and it has therefore been 
employed in this work.  
 
Table 2, above, shows summary MSD scores (100*Mean-squared Deviation) organized as follows: 
each of the first 6 columns represents one non-constant sum game, while the last column gives the 
average MSD over all games, which is a summary statistic by which the models can be roughly 
compared. The first three rows present the MSDs of the Nash equilibrium and of the I.B. 
equilibrium predictions (for β =0=α ) on the transformed and original payoffs respectively. The 
remaining three rows display MSDs of the I.A.+I.B. model on the original payoffs: in the fourth 
row, the parameters are separately estimated for each game (12 parameters in total);  in the fifth 
row, the estimated 2 parameters that best fit the data over all 6 games (and over all but Game 7) are 
employed (the same two β ,α  that minimize the average score over all games are used to compute 
the MSDs for each game); in the last row the accuracy of the prediction of the hybrid model is 
showed when behavior in each of the 6 games is predicted based on the 2 parameters that best fit 
the other 5 games (and excluding Game 7).   
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Table 3: MSD scores of the IBE and of the proposed equilibrium concept 
Model  G 7  G 8  G 9  G 10  G 11  G 12  Mean 
Nash equilibrium, O.G. 
0 parameters (0;0) All games 
G8‐12   
 
6.076 
 
1.225 
 
.354 
 
.708 
 
.422 
 
.064 
 
1.475 
.555 
I.B. equ
0 param
ilibrium, T.G.           
eters  (0;0)All games 
G8‐12   
 
.315 
 
.035 
 
.416 
 
.224 
 
.094 
 
.205 
 
.215 
.195 
I.B. equilibrium, O.G.           
0 parameters(0;0)  All games 
G8‐12   
 
.330 
 
1.174 
 
1.825 
 
.878 
 
.497 
 
.209 
 
.819 
.917 
Hybrid by game, O.G
 12 parameters      Al
G8‐12                             
. 
l games 
 
.090 
 
.003 
 
.031 
 
.033 
 
.056 
 
.000 
 
.035 
.025 
Hybrid best fit,   O.G.  
2 parameters 
            All games  (.157,.160)  
G8‐12  (.252,.257)  
 
 
.746 
- 
 
 
.178 
.042 
 
 
.428 
.098 
 
 
.152 
.033 
 
 
.140 
.173 
 
 
.030 
.034 
 
 
.279 
.076 
Hybrid predict,  O.G. 
2 parameters         All game
                           Without G 7 
s      
 
2.220 
- 
 
.238 
.044 
 
.585 
.149 
 
.186 
.033 
 
.141 
.189 
 
.031 
.035 
 
.567  
.09 
 
Table 3 summarizes further evidence in favor of the newly developed equity-driven impulse 
balance equilibrium. One can see from the third row that if the parameters of inequality aversion are 
allowed to be fit separately in each game, the improvements in terms of reduction of MSD are 
significant, both with respect to the Nash and impulse balance equilibrium. 
Moreover, even when restricting the number of parameters to 2 (common to all games, cf. row 5 
“best fit”), the mean MSD is still more than five times smaller than Nash’s. If one doesn’t include 
the extremely high MSD reported in both cases for Game 7 (for reasons discussed below), the gap 
actually increases, as the hybrid concept’s MSD becomes more than seven times smaller than 
Nash’s. With respect to the overall MSD mean of the IBE, when considering all games the hybrid 
has a higher MSD, although the same order of magnitude (.279 and .215 respectively). If one 
focuses only on games 8-12, again we have a marked superiority of the hybrid model over the IBE, 
as the MSD of the latter is more than twice that of the new concept.  
A similar pattern is appears in the last row of the table, concerning the predictive capability: if 
Game 7 is excluded, the values are in line with the ones obtained in the fifth row, indicating 
stability of the parameters who survive the cross-validation test. One comforting consideration 
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regarding the appropriateness of the exclusion of Game 7 comes from the widespread anomalous 
high level of its MSD score in all rows of the table, which for both Nash and Hybrid predict is about 
four times the corresponding mean level obtained over the six games. It is plausible that this 
evidence is related to the location of Game 7 in the parameter space. It is in fact located at near the 
border, as previously pointed out, and therefore may be subject to the overvaluation of extreme 
probabilities by the subjects due to overweighting of small probabilities. An addition to the present 
work, which is currently in progress, considers incorporating fairness motives in the quantal 
response equilibrium notion, one that has recently attracted considerable attention thanks to its 
ability to rationalize behavior observed in experimental games. In addition to providing an 
interesting case for comparison, it should also allow to shed light on the suspected anomalous 
nature of Game 7. 
 
Quantal Response Equilibrium and Inequity Aversion 
 
The former analysis has also been conducted utilizing the quantal response equilibrium concept 
(henceforth QRE) in conjunction with preferences that are again allowed to be affected by the 
counterparty’s fate, via the inequity aversion parameters. Before showing the results, which are 
given in Table 4 and Table 5 and show an even better overall performance of this concept compared 
to the one examined in the previous sections, let’s briefly describe the QRE. The concept, 
introduced by (Mckelvey, Palfrey and Thomas, 1995), models games with noisy players: these 
probabilistic choice models are based on quantal best responses to the behavior of the other parties, 
so that deviations from optimal decisions are negatively correlated with the associated costs. That is 
to say, individuals are more likely to select better choices than worse choices, but do not necessarily 
succeed in selecting the very best choice. In the exponential form of quantal response equilibrium, 
considered here, the probabilities are proportional to an exponential with the expected payoff 
multiplied by the logit precision parameter (ߣሻ in the exponent: as λ increases, the response 
functions become more responsive to payoff differences. Formally, 
ሻ       (2) 
Where i,j=1,2 are the players (݇ ് ), ܲ  is the probability of player i choosing strategy j and ߨ  is 
player i’s expected payoff when choosing strategy j given the other player is playing according to 
the probability distribution ܲ . 
݆ ௜௝ ௜௝
ି௜
 
Two measures of the relative performance of the I.A.-adjusted Quantal Response 
Equilibrium: best fit and predictive power. Results in terms of Best fit 
 
The following is a companion table to Table 2, as it reports the results of comparisons between the 
new hybrid model and the IBE concept, the former always outperforming the one employing the 
‘pure’ IBE on the transformed games. Note that the penultimate column now compares the 
performance of the two proposed concepts, showing that the one employing QRE outperforms the 
in five of the six games1.  
 
 Table 4: Ex-post (best fit) descriptive power of QRE with inequity aversion 
 
 
FREQUENCY 
 [fu; fl] 
N.E. 
[Pu;Ql]   
BEST FIT  QRE+I.A. 
 [Pu;Ql] ( β ,α )   
 λ 
IBE 
[Pu;Ql]   
 (0;0) 
QRE+I.A 
ê  
IBE+I.A? 
O.G.+QRE+IA
ê 
T.G.+IBE? 
TG7 [.141;.564]  [.]  (;)  [.104;.634]  
 
n.a. 
OG7 [.141;.564] [.091;.909]  [.141;.564] (.105;.209) 
 λ=0.335 
[.091;.500] YES YES 
TG8 [.250;.586]  [.] (.) 
  
[.258;.561]  n.a. 
OG8 [.250;.586] [.182;.727]  [.250;.586] (.097;.386) 
λ=0.335 
[.224;.435] YES YES 
TG9 [.254;.827]  [] (.) [.188;.764]  
 
n.a. 
OG9 [.254;.827] [.273;.909] [.254;.827] (.083;.316)  
λ=0.6 
[.162;.659] YES 
 
YES 
TG10 [.366;.699]  [.] (.)  
 
[.304;.724]  n.a. 
OG10 [.366;.699] [.364;.818]  [.366;.699] (.250;.254) 
λ=0.31 
[.263;.616] YES YES 
TG11 [.311;.652]  [] ()  
 
[.354;.646]  n.a. 
OG11 [.311;.652] [.364;.727]  [.311;.652] (.003;.02)  
λ=0.91 
[.316;.552] YES YES 
TG12 [.439;.604]  []  () 
  
[.496;.575]  n.a. 
OG12 [.439;.604] [.455;.636]  [.439;.604](.042;.137) 
λ=0.55 
[.408;.547] same YES 
 
                                                 
1 in game 12 they achieve a substantially equal equilibrium prediction. 
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As before, in order to assess the performance of the concepts over multiple games, the parameters 
are restricted to be the same over all the games, as shown in the penultimate row in Table 5: the 
QRE+IA concept displays a better fit than the IBE+IA (smaller mean square deviation) in all but 
game 11, achieving a mean MSD of .147 as opposed to .279 for the latter. As for the predictive 
power, measured through jackknifing (cross-predicting), when all games are considered the mean 
MSD is substantially lower for the QRE-based concept incorporating fairness motives, averaging 
.219 vs. a score of .567 for the IBE-based one. 
      
Table 5: MSD scores of the proposed equilibrium concepts 
Model  G 7  G 8  G 9  G 10  G 11  G 12  Mean 
Nash equilibrium, O.G. 
0 parameters (0;0) All games 
 
6.076 
 
1.225 
 
.354 
 
.708 
 
.422 
 
.064 
 
1.475 
 
I.B. equilibrium, O.G.           
0 parameters(0;0)  All games 
 
.330 
 
1.174 
 
1.825 
 
.878 
 
.497 
 
.209 
 
.819 
 
I.B. equilibrium, T.G.           
0 parameters  (0;0)All games 
 
.315 
 
.035 
 
.416 
 
.224 
 
.094 
 
.205 
 
.215 
 
Hybrid QRE by ga
 18 parameters       
me, O.G.   
5.5* 
10^-6 
 
2.4* 
10^-7 
 
7.5* 
10^-6 
 
6.4* 
10^-7 
 
7.4* 
10^-8 
 
5.7* 
10^-6 
 
3.3*10^-6 
Hybrid  best fit O.G.,      
    parameters  ( β ,α , λ) 
2 par.  IBE+IA  (.157,.160)  
3 par.QRE+IA  (.147,.243,.43)  
 
 
.746 
.251 
 
 
.178 
.012 
 
 
.428 
.397 
 
 
.152 
.036 
 
 
.140 
.163 
 
 
.030 
.027 
 
 
.279 
.147 
Hybrid predict,  O.G. 
2 par.  IBE+IA                           
3 par. QRE+IA                           
     
 
2.220 
.415 
 
.238 
.016 
 
.585 
.640 
 
.186 
.038 
 
.141 
.177 
 
.031 
.029 
 
.567 
.219 
 
Two important considerations should be remarked at this point. Firstly, for what concerns the 
overall fit, even without excluding the potentially problematic game 7, the QRE+IA concept 
outperforms the traditional impulse balance equilibrium applied to the transformed games (MSD 
scores are .147 and .215, respectively); this is noteworthy, since it wasn’t the case for the other 
hybrid concept2. Secondly, the above considerations are confirmed by the predictions obtained with 
                                                 
2 In fact, the ‘pure’ impulse balance equilibrium obtains dramatically higher MSD scores when the original games are 
employed in place of the transformed ones, with an almost four‐fold increase. The intuition behind this is, loosely 
speaking, that the IBE is not as parameter‐free as it looks: that is, by utilizing transformed payoffs for each game 
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the jackknifing technique: for the QRE+IA specification the mean MSD score based on cross-
predictions is not substantially higher than the one calculated when the parameters that best fit all 
games are employed (.219 and .147, respectively). This doesn’t hold for the IBE+IA concept, 
whose score roughly doubles from .279 to .5673.   
 
Based on the above comparisons, the inequity aversion generalization of the quantal response 
equilibrium concept appears to emerge as the best performing in terms of goodness of fit among the 
considered stationary concepts. Based on this realization and following the behavioral stationary 
concept interpretation of mixed equilibrium4, one may conclude that the proposed other-regarding 
generalization of the QRE is the behavioral stationary concept that best models the probability of 
choosing one of two strategies in various non constant-sum games spanning a wide parameter 
space. More specifically, even when restricting the degrees of freedom of the parametric models 
and comparing the goodness of fit utilizing the same parameters (β ,α , λ if any)  for all six games, 
the other-regarding QRE outperforms all of the other stationary concepts considered here. The 
order, starting with the most successful with the goodness of fit decreasing progressively, is the 
following (see the grey highlighted rows in Table 5): QRE+IA, IBE on the transformed games, 
IBE+IA and Nash equilibrium. 
 
Of course, the previous comparison is biased against the more parsimonious concepts, in particular 
the parameter-free Nash equilibrium and IBE concepts (see footnote 1 regarding the latter). In order 
to trade off the predictive parsimony of a theory against its descriptive power, one can employ 
Selten’s Measure of Predictive Success (Selten, 1991). This is currently ongoing work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
(although based on common definition of aspiration level), it effectively allows for game‐specific adjustments similar 
to those obtained by adding a parameter which can take different values in each game.         
3 Note also that the QRE+IA mean of the MSD when cross‐predicting is approximately equal to the mean score for the 
‘pure’ IBE on all transformed games, further confirming the stability of the parameters in the other‐regarding version 
of QRE.  
4 that sees it as the result of evolutionary (or learning) processes in a situation of frequently repeated play with two 
populations of randomly matched opponents. 
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Part II. Evolutionary lessons from the Prisoner’s dilemma 
  
The previous analysis has illustrated the importance of pro-social in explaining departures from the 
predictions originating from the Nash equilibrium concept. Such predictions, although often 
diverging from observed behavior, are still to be considered a fundamental benchmark to compare 
alternative ones with, and indeed perform quite well in competitive contexts [citations here]. In 
highly competitive environments, especially in those characterized by a large pool of actors 
interacting in anonymous and/or single-shot contexts (for instance in financial markets), individual 
and aggregate behavior is likely to reflect a high degree of focus on the merely materialistic payoff. 
However, in many real life situations, the drivers of human behavior seem to be far more than the 
absolute return to an interaction. It has been pointed out by many scholars […], that while it may be 
perfectly acceptable for agents to play the payoff-maximizing strategy and disregard other agents’ 
payoffs, it is not necessarily the case for environments in which social preferences play an 
important role, and payoff-maximizing behavior would lead to social stigma and  guilt. An often 
quoted example suggesting that people’s decisions are driven by equity concerns (usually opposing  
individualistic motives), is that of charity donations, which reflect a tendency towards redistribution 
of wealth towards the worse-off.    
 
Moreover, experiments [cite] have also shown that humans are willing to sacrifice part of their 
endowments in an effort to reduce disparities between individuals who earn substantially more than 
the average and those with an income which is substantially below the average. This in a context of 
random endowment distribution, which does away with punishment originating from behaviors 
perceived as unjust. That is, most subjects of the experiment invested substantial fractions of their 
endowment  to make the richest less rich and the poorest less poor, even though the opponents just 
happened to be endowed with those amounts of money, independently of their strategies. Many 
other studies document departures from the self-interest hypothesis, see for example Gintis et al. 
(2003) for a review of recent experimental evidence in different classes of games.  
 
In a forthcoming paper5, Hoff et al. also show an impressive amount of observed spiteful behavior 
in a version of the 3-players ultimatum game experiment run in several remote Indian villages (so 
that the inhabitants of different villages wouldn’t recognize the names of their opponents from 
different villages. They carefully selected the sample so that individuals would either belong to a 
 
5 HOFF, K., KSHETRAMADE,M., FEHR, E. (2008): Spite and Development, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
4619 
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very high caste or a very low one, and the matching technology was devised in such a way that 
anonymity would be guaranteed, yet players would indirectly extrapolate the caste to which the 
counterparty belonged.6 One neat conclusion the authors draw is that high caste individuals exhibit 
a substantial amount of anti-social behavior, in particular against low-caste subjects, often 
punishing the cooperating opponent to prove their strengths. 
 
These results suggest that in many situations there is more to human behavior than just selfish 
behavior as implied by the best reply notion. While own payoff is an important component of one’s 
strategy, realistic “games of life” are played along other dimensions as well. One such dimension is 
captured by the Inequity Aversion parameters, which allow for altruistic considerations (ߙ 
parameter of advantageous IA) as well as more traditional envy considerations by means of the ߚ 
parameter. In the previous section, we have seen how already powerful stationary concepts such as 
IBE and QRE can be substantially improved in their ability to fit and predict frequencies of plays 
for six non-constant sum games spanning a wide parameter space, even when adjusting for the 
increased number of parameters with Selten’s technique7. 
 
In what follows, we will further explore the same question, namely whether social preferences play 
a tangible role in affecting individuals’ strategies of play, but from a different angle. Firstly, based 
on the above considerations, we will expand the preference space with respect to the standard IA 
specification given in (1), by relaxing the constraints on the parameters ߙ and ߚ. Secondly, we will 
focus on timing and spatial considerations, and in particular on whether cooperative behavior can be 
evolutionarily robust in relation to the structure of the population and to the level of information 
agents have on their counterparties. A recurring question that will come out throughout the analysis 
will be whether altruism has evolved in human beings by means of a process of cultural (or natural) 
selection. Before proceeding with the details of the modeling specification, a simple analytical 
result will be shown in order to bridge the previous stationary IA investigation with the current 
evolutionary approach. 
 
 
6 Individuals were told the family name of the opponent, who would be from a very distant village. This piece of 
information allows individuals to know what caste does the opponent belong with a high degree of confidence, while 
preserving anonymity due to the distance between and small size of the villages. 
7 See SELTEN, R. (1991): Properties of a Measure of Predictive Success”, Mathematical Social Sciences, 21, pages 153‐
167 
 
19  
 
௜ ൌ ݔ௜ െ ߙ௜݉ܽݔ൛ݔ௝ െ ݔ௜, 0ൟ െ ߚ௜݉ܽݔ൛ݔ௜ െ ݔ௝, 0ൟ
૙ ൑ ࢼ࢏ ൑ ૚
௝ሻ
௜ሻ
௜ ൑ 1ሻ
௜ െ ݔ௝ሻ
ࢼ࢏ ൑ ࢻ࢏
ߙ
                                                
The establishment of cooperation in well-mixed populations: a generalization of IA to other-
regarding preferences allowing for pro-social as well as anti-social behavior  
 
Based on the experimental evidence cited above, it seems reasonable to extend the standard 
inequality aversion model in (1) to more general domains accounting for strong altruism as well as 
spiteful behavior: in particular, we will consider in turn the implications of dropping the 
assumptions that Fehr and Schmidt impose on the parameters accounting for inequity aversion in 
their specification of agent’s utility functions, ࣯ . 
 
       (IA 1) 
 
Let’s first focus on the last term of (1), representing the positive deviations from the reference 
outcome (ݔ . Restricting the parameter space to values of ߚ laying between zero and one means, on 
one hand (0 ൑ ߚ , ruling out the existence of spiteful individuals who enjoy being better off than 
the opponent, and on the other hand (ߚ  ruling out the existence of strongly altruistic subjects 
who care enough about the well being of the other player to incur in a decrease in utility which is 
greater than the payoff difference (ݔ . Both possibilities are coherent and some degree of 
similar pro- and anti-social behavior has been observed in the cited literature8, so excluding them ex 
ante may bias the analysis against well documented behaviors that appear to have survived the 
evolutionary pressures shaping the evolution of human preferences.      
 
       (IA 2) 
 
The second assumption that Fehr and Schmidt make on the parameters concerns the presumed loss 
aversion in social comparisons. When considered in conjunction with the ‘moderate aversion’ to 
advantageous inequality embodied in (IA 1), it seems in fact plausible to postulate that negative 
deviations from the reference outcome count more than positive ones (disadvantageous inequity 
induce higher disutility than advantageous inequity). However, when (IA 1) is dropped and agents 
are free to exhibit strongly altruistic and spiteful behavior, the assumption that ߚ is at most as big as 
 is no longer justified in all domains. To illustrate this point, let’s consider individual i whose 
preferences satisfy a slight modification of the above parameter restrictions that maintains the 
 
8 See the references at the end for more literature on the subject. 
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asymmetric other regarding preferences of the familiar form9. That is, let the parameters modeling 
other-regarding (henceforth OR) behavior satisfy the following inequalities: 
 
 1      (OR 1) 
 
Note that the above inequalities violate (IA 2) while satisfying (IA 2), still entailing that an agent 
responds with a utility loss to both negative and positive deviations from the reference outcome. 
The difference lies in ߚ no longer being bounded upwards (allowing for strong altruism), and its 
magnitude (representing the altruistic disutility from advantageous inequality) now being greater 
than the disutility from disadvantageous inequality. I don’t see any particular reason why this case 
should be ruled out a priori, instead of letting the evolutionary forces decide. 
 
Another example of reasonable preferences that are ruled out in the standard IA model is given by 
 
       (OR 2) 
 
Loosely speaking, the intuition is that an agent whose preference parameters satisfy the inequalities 
in (OR 2) simply cares more about the counterparty than about herself10, a possibility which may 
well apply to the truly altruistic agents.    
 
Consider  a game which sets the harshest conditions for the emergence and survival of cooperation, 
the Prisoner Dilemma (PD). The following formulation (subset of all PDs) will be employed, 
 
Table 6: row player’s reproductive (material) success in the PD game 
 C D 
C ܾ െ  ܿ ܿ െ
D ܾ 0 
 
Where b and c are, respectively, the benefits and costs to the cooperative effort (e.g. the gains and 
losses occurring when undertaking contribution to a public good). In a population of size N and 
                                                 
9 The ‘conditional altruism’ inherent in the inequity aversion framework is preserved so long as ߙ and ߚ are non‐
negative, implying that both positive and negative deviations from the opponent’s outcome induce a utility loss. 
10 as for a given absolute deviation between the two payoffs, she will incur a bigger utility reduction when being the 
one with the higher payoff.      
21  
 
टࢉሺ࢈, ࢉ, ࢏, ࡺሻ ൌ
࢏ି૚
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consisting of i cooperators (and N-i defectors), the payoff to the cooperators and defectors is given, 
respectively, by: 
࢈
 टࢊሺ࢈, ࢏, ࡺሻ ൌ
࢏
ࡺି૚
െ ࢉ     ሺ3ሻ 
࢈
ࢁഥሺ࢈, ࢉ, ࢏, ࡺሻ ൌ ࢏
ࡺ
                ሺ4ሻ 
 
In terms of the average payoff in the population, 
 
ሺ࢈ െ ࢉሻ        ሺ5ሻ 
 
It is well known that, without any mechanism for the evolution of cooperation, natural selection will 
favor defectors, since (in a mixed population) they have a higher payoff than cooperators. 
Interpreting payoffs as fitness, the selection process will eventually drive the frequency of  the 
cooperators (and the average fitness of the population) to zero, implying the extinction of 
cooperators, and the socially undesirable all-defect 0-outcome reminiscent of the one-shot PD game 
with self-interested agents. 
Now consider modifying the payoff matrix to allow for other-regarding behavior, one gets:  
 
Table 7: row player’s reproductive success in the PD game with OR 
 C D 
C ܾ െ ܿ െܿ െ ߙሺܾ ൅ ܿሻ
D ܾ െ  ߚሺܾ ൅ ܿሻ 0  
 
Note that there is no ambiguity with respect to the direction of the IA, as off the main diagonal the 
cooperator is exploited and will have no advantageous inequity aversion (ߚ=0), while the defector 
free rides the benefit b without paying the cost c, and will have no disadvantageous inequity 
aversion (ߙ=0)11. Along the main diagonal, the payoffs aren’t affected by the IA adjustment, as the 
players get the same materialistic payoff due to the symmetry of the game.    
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 See Table 1 for the general payoff matrix under inequity aversion. 
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Evolutionary escape from the prisoner’s dilemma: theoretical findings 
 
In the PD the only dominant strategy is to Defect, so cooperation in Table 6 will be never achieved, 
and is by no means evolutionarily stable. If one considers the modified matrix in Table 7, though, 
one can easily see show that the Cooperate strategy will be ESS provided that the advantageous IA 
parameter ߚ is greater than the ratio of the cost to the sum of the benefit and cost. This follows from 
the condition for the cooperative strategy to be ESS, which is simply that the sum of a player’s 
payoffs when cooperating must be  greater than the sum of her payoffs when defecting: in the 
setting described in table (2), this yields precisely the condition 
 
     ሺ૟ሻ 
࢈
ࢉ
 
Note that (6) doesn’t require a value of ߚ greater than 1, i.e. it’s consistent with both the standard 
IA and the augmented parameter space OR specifications (although allowing for strong altruism 
reduces the dependency of the result on the small magnitude of the relative cost). 
   
Proposition 1 (sufficient condition for ESS cooperation) 
 
So long as the parameter capturing aversion to inequality in one’s own favor is greater than the 
relative cost of the altruistic act (cooperating), an infinitely large population of cooperators cannot 
be invaded under deterministic selection dynamics.  
 
By rearranging terms in (6), the condition can be expressed in terms of the benefit-to-cost ratio, as: 
    
൐
૚
ࢼ
െ ૚    ሺૠሻ 
0
1
 
This formulation better allows to see the dependency of the evolutionary stability result for 
cooperation on the magnitude of ߚ: on one side of the spectrum, we have the complete self-interest 
case (ߚ ൌ ) where no matter how big the rewards to cooperation are, the cooperative strategy will 
never be ESS; on the opposite side of the spectrum, we have the case of maximal advantageous 
inequity aversion (ߚ ൌ ) where, so long as the benefits are greater than the costs to cooperation, 
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ࢉ
cooperation will always be an evolutionarily stable strategy and will be immune from defectors 
invasions. 
 
Such results fits in well with (Nowak, 2006), where rules for the success of cooperation in the 
standard PD game are derived in terms of the payoffs and of other characteristics which can 
compensate for the payoff reduction arising from cooperating in a competitive environment (under 
sole natural selection forces), and  establish cooperation. These mechanisms, namely kin selection, 
direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity and group selection, are shown to suffice 
for the evolution of cooperation whenever the benefit-to-cost ratio exceeds a certain mechanism-
specific threshold. Modified payoff matrices qualitatively similar to the one in Table 2 are derived 
(more on it will follow in the next section) and conditions are given for the cooperative strategy to 
be ESS (as well as risk dominant12, in what follows RD). For example, in the group selection case, 
the threshold is  ࢈ ൐ ࢔
࢓
൅ 1
                                                
 ,and the characteristics added to the basic environment to find an 
evolutionary escape from the prisoner’s dilemma are the maximum group size n and the number of 
groups m. That is to say, the smaller and the more groups there are, the better the chances for 
cooperation to strive.  
 
Our previous finding also poses conditions for the survival of cooperation, only in terms of how 
agents’ preferences rather than in terms of the surrounding environmental characteristics, such as 
groups structure (or genetic relatedness, or probability of encountering the same player in a 
subsequent round). As we will see from the analysis below, however, inequity averse preferences 
alone cannot render cooperation a risk dominant strategy, unless one is willing to drop the 
assumption that ߚ cannot exceed ߙ. This can arise in many meaningful preference specifications 
that generalize the IA framework to allow for a greater variety of responses to positive and negative 
deviation from the reference outcome. 
 
 
12 In standard game theory a Nash equilibrium is considered risk dominant if it has the largest basin of attraction, 
meaning the more uncertainty a player has about the actions of the other player, the more likely the risk dominant 
strategy will be chosen. Evolutionary models such as Mailath & Rob (1993) and Young (1993)  support the idea that the 
risk dominant equilibrium is favored by evolution, by showing that if the rule to update one's strategy allows for 
mutations that asymptotically reach zero over time, the likelihood that the risk dominant equilibrium is reached goes to 
one (even if it is payoff dominated). 
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Recent contributions, such as Bolle (2000) and Possajennikov (2000), have drawn the attention on 
the parameter space concerning the degree of altruism and spite one should allow for when 
modeling the evolutionary stability of other-regarding preferences. In particular, they have 
independently criticized and relaxed restrictions that Bester and Guth (1998) had imposed on the 
parameters. Given the resonance with IA preferences employed here, it is worth briefly introduce 
some notation from Bester and Guth (BG henceforth). Two agents play a symmetric game and are 
assumed to maximize a weighted sum of the own payoff and of the counterparty’s payoff, in order 
to allow for the possibility that individuals have other-regarding preferences that go beyond their 
material payoffs. Formally, 
 
,    ࢏      (8) 
 
where ܷ is the material payoff to player i, while ߙ  re preference parameters (subject to 
evolutionary selection), which are positive under altruism, zero under own profit maximization and 
negative under spite. As Bolle and Possajennikov show (respectively in the domains of spiteful and 
altruistic preferences), the preference restrictions imposed by BG, namely of ruling out spite and 
what I will call ‘strong altruism’, aren’t theoretically justified and should be relaxed. More 
specifically, BG assume 0 ൑  and 0 ൑  and Bolle and Possajennikov separately show 
that arbitrarily large negative and positive values of the two parameters should be allowed, in order 
to let the evolutionary pressures ultimately decide whether spite and strong altruism should be ruled 
out. We will evaluate the importance of these parameter restrictions throughout the remainder of 
Part II; but first, let’s reconsider the sufficient for cooperation to be ESS:  
 
Lemma 1 
 
Even in the absence of structural mechanisms favoring the evolution of cooperation, such as 
reciprocity (of direct, indirect or network type), non-individual selection (of kin and group kind) or 
cognitive limits (leading to heuristics such as “imitate the successful behavior” in structured 
populations), Proposition (1) continues to hold. Therefore, if favorable historical conditions (such as 
repeated interactions in small groups) have allowed the establishment of cooperation, when other-
regarding preferences are allowed and the benefit-to-cost ratio exceeds the ଵ
ఉ
െ 1 threshold, 
cooperation cannot be displaced. 
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ߚ
ܿ ܾ
ܿ ܾ
attraction greater than  ଶ
ଷ
Note that the results in Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 follow directly from the general property that a 
strategy that yields a strict symmetric Nash equilibrium13 is evolutionary stable as well: therefore, 
when investigating these types of games, in order to assess the evolutionary stability of a strategy, 
all one needs to show is the existence of the corresponding unique Nash equilibrium. 
 
It should be noted at this point, that although an ESS strategy is resistant against invasion, the 
relative size of the basin of attraction is what ultimately decides the amount of time spent in the 
long run in each equilibrium when both are ESS, which is the non-degenerate case we will focus 
most of the attention on (and depends on the size of ߚ relative to the percentage cost). To argue that, 
let alone the possibility that historical conditions may have led to the establishment of 
evolutionarily stable cooperation, cooperators can (under certain conditions) invade a mixed 
population, we will introduce two more results, followed by some numerical examples aimed at 
clarifying the propositions. 
 
First, let’s bear in mind that cooperation will be a risk-dominant strategy if there exist values of ߙ 
and ߚ for which the sum of a player’s payoffs when cooperating is greater than the sum of her 
payoffs when defecting. Moreover, cooperation will be advantageous if there exist values of ߙ and 
 for which the sum of the payoff to reciprocal cooperation and twice the payoff to cooperating 
when the opponent defects is greater than the sum of the payoff to defecting when the opponent 
cooperates and twice the payoff to mutual defection. The last condition plays an important role in 
determining the fixation probability of cooperation in stochastic game dynamics with finite 
populations14. 
In terms of the payoffs in Table 6, these conditions translate to: 
• C is risk‐dominant if ܾ െ 2 ൐  
• C is advantageous  if ܾ െ 3 ൐  
Which are obviously never satisfied. Nevertheless, if we again consider subjective utility functions 
that take also in account the relative standing of one’s payoff with respect to the other player’s, 
cooperation can be not only risk-dominant, but also advantageous, therefore having a basin of 
. The following two inequalities, which are obtained simply by applying the 
                                                 
13 For which the agents’ best responses are unique, as is the case for the cooperative strategy in the modified PD game 
when the threshold is met. 
14 See Nowak et al. (2004) for a clear explanation of the implications of being advantageous for a strategy, in terms of 
the probability that a single mutant originating from it (and its successors) will replace a homogeneous population 
initially following the other strategy. An advantageous strategy will overtake the ‘hostile’ population with a probability  
greater than the inverse of its size, therefore fixating with greater probability than the random drift.  
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ሺࢻ െ ࢼሻ ൏ െ2
ࢉ
࢈ ൅ ࢉ
conditions for risk-dominance and advantageousness to Table 7, are the basis for the paired 
propositions aimed at summarizing the findings.    
 
      ሺૢሻ 
 
roposition 2 (sufficient condition for risk-dominant cooperation) 
o long as the difference between the disadvantageous deviation and the advantageous deviation 
ሺ૛ࢻ െ ࢼሻ ൏ െ૜
ࢉ
࢈ ൅ ࢉ
P
 
S
preference parameters is sufficiently negative (more than twice as negative as the relative cost of 
the altruistic act), cooperation will risk-dominate defection. Namely, when both strategies are ESS, 
the basin of attraction of cooperators is greater than ½.  
 
     ሺ૚૙ሻ 
 
roposition 3 (sufficient condition for advantageous cooperation) 
o long as the difference between the disadvantageous deviation and the advantageous deviation 
P
 
S
preference parameters is sufficiently negative (more than three times as negative as the relative cost 
of the altruistic act), cooperation will be advantageous. Namely, when both strategies are ESS, the 
basin of attraction of cooperators is greater than ଵ
ଷ
 . 
 
Note that both conditions (9) and (10) are satisfied so long as ߙ ا ߚ. This amounts to say that 
completely characterized in terms of the payoffs of the prisoner’s dilemma game. 
                                                
whether a cooperator can invade or not a population of defectors boils down to a comparison of the 
sign and  magnitude of the parameters modeling agents’ responses to deviations from the reference 
outcome. If positive deviations (making more than the other player) are sufficiently more important 
than negative ones (being worse-off than the opponent), a single cooperator will have a fixation 
probability that is greater than the inverse of the (finite) population size15. As a last remark on the 
above propositions, it should be noted that inequalities (6), (9) and (10), corresponding, 
respectively, to the sufficient conditions for ESS, risk-dominant and advantageous cooperation, are 
 
15 In the limit of weak selection. Roughly put, this condition means that in a multilevel selection environment, 
selection between groups (which favors cooperators) is much weaker than selection within groups (which favors 
defectors). See the section on multilevel selection below. 
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ave a tangible 
presentation of their impact on the achievement and robustness of the mutual cooperation 
material payoffs for the row player when b=5 and c=1  
C D 
Evolutionary escape from the prisoner’s dilemma: examples of OR preferences 
 
To better grasp the significance of the other regarding preferences and in order to h
re
outcome, let’s focus on a numerical version of Table 6; consider the following matrix, given by b=5 
and c=1:   
 
Table 8- PD 
 
C 4 െ1 
D 5 0 
 
Again, the o ly dominant strategy is Defect and the Nash equilibrium is (D,D), yielding the 
efficient output (0,0). If we introduce the transformed matrix to account for other-regarding 
ayoffs for the row player when b=5 and c=1 (under OR)  
C D 
n
in
preferences, we get:  
 
Table 9- PD subjective p
 
C 4 െ1 െ 6ߙ 
D 5 െ 6ߚ 0 
 
The above specificatio  guarant s that (C,C) is an evolutionarily stable strategy if ߚ > ଵ
଺
n ee . To get an 
ea of the magnitude of the parameter modeling reactions to positive deviations from the reference id
outcome, note that in the games investigated in Part I16, the value of ߚ that best fits all six games is 
approximately .16 and .15 in the IBE+IA and QRE+IA models respectively, which almost coincides 
with the ଵ
଺
 threshold (=.16ത). 
 
Let’s consider, in turn, d ffei rent values of ߙ and ߚ and check what the result will be in terms of the 
volutionary fate of cooperation. First, assume agents exhibit identical ‘purely altruistic’ 
t
                                                
e
preferences (hereafter PA) with symmetrical reac ions to positive and negative departures from the 
opponent’s outcome given by: 
 
16 which were not PD games but rather non‐constant sum games spanning a wide parameter space (but including an 
almost symmetric one, game 12,  in terms of the observed frequencies and equilibrium predictions) 
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൝ ࢼ ൐ 0
|ࢻ| ൌ |ࢼ|
         ሺ࢙࢟࢓࢓ࢋ࢚࢘࢏ࢉ ۾ۯሻ 
 
An individual with such preferences is a (symmetrical) pure altruist in the sense that she responds to 
neven distributions with a (equal magnitude) utility gain or loss when, respectively, her opponent 
ider the following parameter values: ߙ ൌ െ0.2 and ߚ ൌ ൅0.2 and 
otice that they satisfy (symmetric PA). Now Table 9 becomes: 
nd PA: ࢻ ൌ െ૙. ૛, ࢼ ൌ ൅૙. ૛ ൐ ૚
૟
ࢻ ൏ 0
u
is better-off or worse-off. That is, not only she displays altruistic behavior in the domain of positive 
deviations from the other player’s outcome (by incurring in a utility loss due to the empathy for the 
other player’s underperformance), but she also responds altruistically in the domain of negative 
divergences (by experiencing a utility gain associated with the other player outperforming her). 
While such a strong form of altruism is admittedly uncommon, it is still insightful to consider the 
consequences of PA preferences for the evolution of cooperation; moreover, a less demanding case 
will be subsequently considered. 
 
For the sake of concreteness, cons
n
 
Example 1- PD subjective payoffs for the row player when ࢈ ൌ ૞, ࢉ ൌ ૚ a    
C D  
C 4 0.2 
D 3.8 0 
 
We already k w that ooperation is an ESS, since ߚ is larger than the threshold; moreover, 
efection is not an ESS, as 0.2>0. In fact, one can verify that conditions (9) and (10) are satisfied, 
 but with asymmetrical 
actions to positive and negative departures from the opponent’s outcome17, as given by: 
൝ ࢼ ൐ 0
|ࢻ| ൏ |ࢼ|
         ሺࢇ࢙࢟࢓࢓ࢋ࢚࢘࢏ࢉ ۾ۯሻ 
                                                
no c
d
implying that cooperation is advantageous for the given parameter values.  
 
Now assume agents still exhibit identical ‘purely altruistic’ preferences,
re
 
ࢻ ൏ 0
 
ߙ| ൏ |ߚ
0.1
17 To limit the size of the exposition, we will only focus on the | |case, although its complementary also lends 
itself to meaningful interpretations: when, for example, ߙ ൌ െ0.2 and ߚ ൌ ൅ , the resulting game no longer has 
one symmetric NE, but becomes an anti‐coordination game of the Hawk‐Dove type, in which it is mutually beneficial 
for the players to play different strategies, and the two asymmetric Nash equilibria obtain.  
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An individual with such preferences is an asymmetrical pure altruist in the sense that she responds 
to uneven distributions with a utility gain or loss of unequal magnitude, depending on whether  her 
ൌ ૞, ࢉ ൌ െ૙. ૚, ࢼ ൌ ൅૙. ૛ ൐ ૚
૟
opponent is better-off or worse-off. In particular, the above specification implies that the utility gain 
from the other player’s superior performance is less than the utility loss due to the empathy for the 
other player’s underperformance. Let ߙ ൌ െ0.1 and ߚ ൌ ൅0.2, leading to: 
 
Example 2- PD subjective payoffs for the row player when ࢈ ૚ and PA: ࢻ ൌ   
C D  
C 4 െ0.4 
D 3.8 0 
 
Now both strategies are ESSs, and we have two symmetric Nash equilibria (unlike in the preceding 
ple where only the mutually cooperative equilibrium was evolutionarily stable). Furthermore, 
bit identical ‘conditionally altruistic’ preferences, which 
re given by: 
ࢻ ൏ ߚ
One such agent reacts with a disutility to both positive and negative deviations from the reference 
outcome (as in standard IA preferences), displaying asymmetric behavior in the form of envy when 
Example 3 bjective p  row player when ࢈ ൌ ૞, ࢉ ൌ ૚ and CA: ࢻ ൌ ൅૙. ૚, ࢼ ൌ ൅૙. ૞ ൐
૟
exam
under these OR preference parameters, cooperation is no longer risk-dominant, i.e. defect is the 
strategy with the largest basin of attraction. 
 
Lastly, consider the case of agents that exhi
a
൝
ࢻ ൐ 0
ࢼ ൐ 0         ሺࢇ࢙࢟࢓࢓ࢋ࢚࢘࢏ࢉ ۱ۯሻ 
being outperformed, and altruistic aversion to advantageous inequality. The last inequality implies 
that positive deviations from the opponent’s outcome matter more than negative ones. Letting 
ߙ ൌ ൅0.1 and ߚ ൌ ൅0.5, leads to: 
 
- PD su ayoffs for the ૚ 
C D  
C 4 െ1.6 
D 2 0 
 
For this parameterization, we again have the case of two evolutionarily stable strategies and two 
strict Nash equilibria; what changes with respect to Example 2 is that now cooperation is risk-
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ominant, and therefore has a larger basin of attraction. It nevertheless fails to pass the test for 
tionary investigation of the latter. To some extent, this has been addressed in 
e literature (see, for the complete information scenario, Bester and Guሷ th, 1998 and Guሷ th and 
t-dependent, since the population 
nd group sizes determine the level of “effective uncertainty” faced by the agents, so that when 
                                                
d
advantageousness given by (10), signifying that its basin of attraction (while being larger than that 
of the defect strategy) is not sufficiently large to guarantee that the lineage originating from a single 
mutant of the cooperative strategy will prevail over a population of defectors.  
 
Related literature on the evolution of preferences: can altruism survive when preferences are 
not fully observable? 
  
Of course the sensitivity of the above results on the degree of pro-social behavior (here synthesized 
by ߚ) calls for an evolu
th
Napel, 2006), who show that, under certain conditions, the most debated being the transparency of 
individual preferences resulting from the common knowledge assumption, strategies based on 
materialistic as well as non-materialistic payoffs such as IA can successfully evolve and stabilize 
under pairwise random matching in infinitely large populations. The limitations of the perfect 
observability of preferences have recently been explored by Ok and Vega-Redondo (2001) and 
Dekel et al. (2007), and some alternatives have come forward in order to allow for imperfect 
inference of preferences. Both papers agree on the conclusion that, in the complete lack of 
information on other players’ preferences, Nash materialistic-only solutions will be restored. 
However, in both cases important qualifications must be made.18  
 
In Ok, Vega-Redondo, the stress is posited on the conditions affecting the degree of knowledge 
about the opponents’ preferences, which in their model are contex
a
preference unobservability doesn’t induce sizeable uncertainty (e.g. the size of the population is 
small), incomplete information is not enough to ensure the stability of individualistic preferences. In 
other words, with little de facto uncertainty, although unobservable, individualistic agents need not 
prosper at the expense of the altruists.  
 
 
18 One debatable characteristic that both papers share is the assumption that the aggregate play in the population 
corresponds to a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium: this requires an incredible amount of computational ability on the part of 
rational agents, especially when one’s opponents are allowed to be a multiplicity (as in Ok and Vega-Redondo). In fact, 
in a Bayesian game, a strategy for a player is a complete plan of actions that covers every contingency that might arise 
for every type that player might be. A strategy must not only specify the actions of the player given the type that he is, 
but must specify the actions that he would take if he were of another type. 
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he informational content of the number of subgroups in the 
opulation) and are treated as exogenous in order to analyze the consequences for stability of 
al biological and evolutionary game theoretic models, in which 
netically programmed behavior is the mold on which evolution operates, when it comes to the 
                                                
In Dekel et al., the graduated  levels of preference observability are explicitly considered (rather 
than emerging indirectly as a result of t
p
various degrees of observability. Namely, the parameter p captures the amount of knowledge that an 
agent has on her opponent (the probability of observing her preferences) independently of what the 
opponent observes, as is the case, say for a poker game with private information on the cards and 
different bluffing abilities19. while the general conclusions they draw support Nash equilibrium in 
the context of the evolution of preferences when p=0 (the case of complete lack of information on 
the opponent), these conclusions don’t readily carry over to the cases of intermediate observability 
and, of course, to the opposite degenerate case of complete (payoff and preference) information, 
where the stability of altruism is recovered and the efficient payoff achieved. An important remark 
with respect the scope of the present analysis, concerns the authors’ findings regarding PD games, 
that “inefficient strict equilibria (i.e. Defect-Defect) may fail to be stable with any arbitrarily small 
degree of observability (despite being stable with no observability)”. In fact, they show that the only 
other stable distribution obtains for p=1, and is characterized by a monomorphic population20 where 
all individuals are ‘unexploitable’ conditional cooperators, who will only cooperate if the opponent 
cooperates with probability one. Such a preference turns out to be evolutionarily stable as, loosely 
speaking, those who possess it are exempt from the typical exploitation from defectors or from 
cooperators who will cooperate on fewer occasions, this last situation being ruled out by the 
degenerate value of p=1.       
   
To summarize, the lesson to be drawn from the recent literature on the evolution of preferences is 
that, unlike in the tradition
ge
evolution of human preferences in complex adaptive systems, it seems unlikely that an inherited 
behavioral package guides agents in all the decisions to be made throughout life. It may instead well 
be the case that preferences are context-dependent and a different answer might apply depending on 
the specifics of the interactions that are considered. That is to say, certain environments will favor 
altruistic behavior, while others will favor individualism. In particular, factors that augment the 
observability of types, such as the  presence of relatively large subgroups in Ok and Vega-Redondo 
(implying a small effective matching uncertainty) or the ability to detect the opponent’s intentions 
 
19 Note that this specification doesn’t suit well in situations where opponents’ reciprocal information is highly 
correlated. For example, to further expand the gaming analogy, in community card poker games such as Texas 
hold’em, one player’s information on an opponent is not independent of the opponent’s knowledge.   
20 A monomorphic population is one where all individuals have identical preferences 
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or 
uccessful pro-social behavior.  
ehavior in the prisoner’s dilemma. Namely, the above examples 
hed light on the importance of the context in determining whether cooperation will spread and 
ne alternative way
in Dekel et al. (which, for example, is likely to be greater in societies where agents frequently 
engage in face-to-face interactions), can suffice to immunize altruism against egoistic mutants.    
 
Hence, in contexts where preferences are, to some degree at least, observable, the match between 
evolution of preferences and standard evolutionary models is likely to dissolve, leaving room f
s
 
To sum up, even from the three stylized cases considered above, one can already draw meaningful 
lessons about other-regarding b
s
whether it will be stable once it has established itself in a large population. The answer to the latter 
question is yes (given the choice of ߚ), but, when it comes to the former, we get mixed results. The 
most favorable one for altruism obtains  in Example 1, where cooperation is not only risk-dominant,  
but also advantageous (and Defect is not an ESS). Such a neat conclusion supporting the 
evolutionary success of cooperation is not achieved in Example 2, in which both strategies are ESS, 
but Defect has a larger basin of attraction. Finally, Example 3 gives us an opportunity to observe a 
mixed bag result: again both strategies are ESS and two symmetric pure Nash equilibria arise, as 
was the case for the previous example. In comparison to the latter, however, cooperation now has 
the larger basin of attraction (but not sufficiently large to be advantageous).  
 
Spatial considerations in the prisoner’s dilemma 
 
O  to model the (experimentally observed) tendency to cooperation is, as 
 such as those arising when imposing structure 
n the population, i.e. via group formation and splitting. Before turning to these considerations, 
tions agents’ preferences again contain terms representing two-sided 
inequality aversion, in order to represent the taste for equitable material payoffs. More specifically, 
 be consistent with the indirect evolutionary analysis performed by [Guth, Napel] and in order to 
make comparisons  with their results, let’s consider two alternative quadratic IA preferences, for 
mentioned above, to allowi for spatial considerations
o
we’ll extend the preceding analysis by investigating the evolutionary implications of other-
regarding preferences that are slightly more complicated than the above linear IA ones. Recall the 
linear IA specification ࣯௜൫ߙ௜, ߚ௜, ݔ௜, ݔ௝൯ ൌ ݔ௜ െ ߙ௜݉ܽݔ൛ݔ௝ െ ݔ௜, 0ൟ െ ߚ௜݉ܽݔ൛ݔ௜ െ ݔ௝, 0ൟ,    ݅ ് ݆; 
ߚ௜ ൑ ߙ௜;  0 ൑ ߚ௜ ൑ 1. 
 
In the non-linear specifica
to
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both of which an agent always suffers from unequal material payoffs no matter who is 
disadvantaged: 
 
ट࢏ሺࢽ࢏, ࢞࢏, ࢞࢐ሻ ൌ ࢞࢏ െ ࢽ࢏ටห࢞࢏ െ ࢞࢐ห       (DMD) 
ट࢏ሺࢽ࢏, ࢞࢏, ࢞࢐ሻ ൌ ࢞࢏ െ
ࢽ࢏
૝
ห࢞࢏ െ ࢞࢐ห
૛         (IMD) 
Note that the gamma specification, in terms of the standard s (ߙ and ߚሻ, imposes the 
following constraint:  ߙ௜ ൌ ߚ௜ ൌ ߛ௜ ൒ 0 
In other words, individual i has a non-negative aversion o agnitude with respect to 
isadvantageous as well advantageous inequality. While this assumption may seem strong, it has 
non-constant sum games. In fact, the results for  the  best overall  fitting  
ncept, for which the value of ߙ is remarkably 
ss, let’s assume also ߛ௜ ൌ ߛ௝ and let’s repeat the evolutionary stability 
for row player, accounting for non-linear inequity aversion with decreasing 
 
IA parameter
f the same m
d
been utilized in the cited literature, and, it is backed to some extent from the analysis performed in 
SECION A on the 6 
parameters in the two hybrid games are as follows: 
IBE+IA:  ߙ=.160  ߚ=.157  
QRE+IA  ߙ=.243  ߚ=.147 
Suggesting a strong relevance of the advantageous inequity aversion sentiments, especially when 
modeling the equilibrium decisions with the IB co
close to the value of ߚ. 
For the sake of concretene
analysis for the new utility functions, by resorting to the modified payoff matrices:  
 
Table 10: subjective PD payoffs 
marginal damage (DMD) 
 C D 
C ܾ െ ܿ -c- ߛ√ܾ ൅ ܿ 
D b-ߛ√ܾ ൅ ܿ 0 
Table 11: subjective PD payoffs for row player, accounting for non-linear inequity aversion with increasing 
arginal damage D) 
C D 
m (IM
 
C b-c െܿ െ
ߛ
4
ሺܾ ൅ ܿሻଶ 
D ܾ െ
ߛ
4
ሺܾ ൅ ܿሻଶ 0 
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sing the same conditions for ESS and risk dominance, we can check whether the non-linear 
cification can nalize cooperation in the PD game. As before, cooperation will be ESS under 
conditions that can be interpreted in terms of the magnitude of the preference parameter relative to 
 game payoffs. Namely, the following two are the sufficient conditions for cooperation to be 
volutionarily stable, under decreasing marginal damage IA and increasing marginal damage IA 
U
spe ratio
the
e
respectively: 
 
ࢽ ൐
ࢉ
√࢈ ൅ ࢉ
           ሺ૚૚ሻ 
 
૝ࢉ
ࢽ ൐
ሺ࢈ ൅ ࢉሻ૛
        ሺ૚૛ሻ 
Cooperators, however, will never be risk-dominant (for positive cost of the altruistic action), as 
ere is no value of ߛ for which the sum of a player’s payoffs when cooperating is greater than the 
sum of her payoffs when defecting. This is due to the symmetrical structure of the utility loss, 
which, unlike in the IA and its OR generalization considered above, is assumed by utilizing one 
arameter only (ߛ). Such assumption rules out the ߚ ب ߙ possibility which is the driver behind 
ors have discussed the implications of allowing for population clusters to play a role in 
ining the evolution of norms. For example, Boyd and Richerson (2002), BR in what follows, 
ics model of imitation taking place in isolated population to show that 
group beneficial norms can spread rapidly under plausible conditions”.  
 payoff ones, provided the 
 
th
p
conditions (9) and (10), which can only be satisfied when negative deviations from the reference 
outcome have a different impact than positive ones (as frequently observed in the empirical 
literature).  
        
Structured populations 
 
To shed light on the determinants of altruistic behavior, we introduce structure in the population. 
Several auth
determ
utilize a replicator dynam
“
More specifically, by utilizing replicator equations on a structured population, they model the 
situation where most encounters take place with group members, but  “payoffs are determined by 
the composition of the local group, but cultural traits can diffuse among groups…partially isolated 
groups can be stabilized at different equilibria with different average payoffs.”  Consequently, 
behaviors can rapidly spread from high payoff groups to neighboring low
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olds for finite but large populations. That is, if 
 and not 
take place on much shorter time-scales.  
tcome, namely that 
itation only takes place within isolated groups. 
 not be wiped out by the insurgence of defecting 
ee-riders even in the absence of group selection today, as long as the gains and losses implicit in 
 important, as in a 
odern society interactions among agents have shifted towards the anonymous single-shot type (for 
rate at which imitation among individuals take place is sufficiently high. This feature is the driver of 
the faster time-scale of the norm spread achieved in BR, which sets apart their model from those 
based on group extinction (or splitting, Nowak).   
This approach overcomes some limitations inherent in the majority of the pre-existing literature, 
identified by the authors with respect to the broad category of group selection considered.  
For the within-group models of equilibrium selection in the spirit of [Kandori et al., 1993], which 
focus on the within-group effects of random processes on the frequencies of play of different 
strategies, they highlight a shortcoming which h
mutation rates are small, as is generally assumed in the literature, the stable equilibrium that 
survives  the evolutionary process will be the one with the largest basin of attraction,
(necessarily) the group beneficial trait. 
For the between groups models, characterized by competition between groups on alternative stable 
equilibrium, the time required to transition from one equilibrium to another (possibly more 
beneficial) is on a time-scale of a millennium, making these models well suited to explain historical 
transitions to group beneficial behavior, but not diffusion of a number of social institutions from 
one society to another, which may well 
  
The crucial assumption behind BR is that successful strategies are imitated by neighboring groups, 
even if these strategies will lower imitators’ payoffs in their own group (where different social 
norms are implemented). This assumption is the mechanism that drives the diffusion of the group 
beneficial trait, as it provides the basis for the escape from the “segregation” ou
im
 
Multilevel selection: historical justifications for the evolution of cooperation 
 
If we are satisfied with this historical account of the establishment of altruistic behavior via group 
selection, we are guaranteed that cooperation will
fr
the environment (b,c) and the other-regarding preferences (ߚ) satisfy (6). This is
m
instance due to the customary use of the internet as a mediator for transactions between anonymous 
partners parties in an increasingly global arena). One might argue that in a world characterized by 
impersonal interactions, the conditions that allowed altruistic groups to prevail are no longer in 
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scratch mine” attitude 
ards reciprocating), indirect reciprocity (I will scratch your back because someone else 
(via frequency-dependent selection), but also affects differentially different groups 
production. These payoffs describe the commonly assumed non-dynamical interactions taking 
place, and consequently groups of cooperators will not be able to sustain themselves due to the 
increased cost of credibly signaling one’s adherence to the cooperative norm. 
     
Following Nowak (2006), one can classify the mechanisms by which cooperation can evolve 
according to five broad categories: kin selection (the inclination of related individuals to engage in 
cooperative behavior), direct reciprocity (the “I will scratch your back if you 
tow
scratched mine), network reciprocity (spatial structure is assumed to allow for unevenly mixed 
populations where some individuals interact more frequently than others) and multilevel selection 
(where the population is divided into groups whose members are allowed to enact different 
strategies depending on whether they are  matched with own-group members or with members of 
other groups).   
In the present work we will adopt the latter mechanism to study the evolution of cooperation, and 
we will focus on a rather simple formulation of multilevel (or group) selection, which is suitable to 
analytical investigation and nevertheless captures the basic idea that selection acts not only at the 
individual level 
at the higher spatial level (via constant selection arising from group splitting occurring when groups 
reach the maximum size due to the addition of offsprings). That is, it seems reasonable to presume 
that different groups will spread at different rates; in the simplest form of multilevel selection, 
assume that cooperator groups (only cooperating among each other by paying a cost c for each other 
member of the group to receive a benefit b) and defector groups (never cooperating with anyone 
and therefore incurring neither costs nor benefits) can develop and also be subject to selection 
pressures leading to a higher rate of splitting for successful groups. This is modeled by matching 
every group birth with the extinction of a randomly selected group. Arguably they will evolve at 
different paces, and it may well be that a group of cooperators fares better than a group of defectors.  
 
For the sake of concreteness, we will continue to focus on the prisoner’s dilemma, because of its 
resistance to the cooperative equilibrium. In this environment, the population updating of strategies 
takes  place asynchronously, meaning that at any period a single individual is selected for 
re
place at the group level, namely that groups split at rates that are proportional to the average fitness 
of individuals in that group. When a group splits (with probability p), a randomly selected group is 
taken out in order to maintain the population constant. For small p, the fixation probability of a 
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off matrix which accounts for both levels of 
election (individual and at the group level). First note that, since cooperator groups have a constant 
single cooperator in the entire population is given by the fixation probability of a single cooperator 
in a group times the fixation probability of that group. 
 
Utilizing the findings from Nowak (2006) and Langer et al. (2008), and recalling the PD 
formulation in table (1), one can shift attention to a pay
s
payoff b−c, while defector groups have a constant payoff 0, one can think of the between-group 
selection in terms of a payoff matrix as well, as if the groups were playing the following game: 
 
Table 12: between group selection  
 C D 
C ܾ െ ܿ ܾ െ ܿ 
D 0 0 
 
Let m and n be the maximum group size and the maximum number of groups respectively. Nowak 
ws that t e payoffs orresponding to the overall dynamics (stemming from the frequency-
ependent selection at the individual level and from the constant selection at the group level), can 
sho h c
d
be aggregated by simply adding the two matrices multiplied by their respective population sizes. 
This yields a unified payoff matrix whose payoffs summarize all the relevant information, 
  
Table 13: combined matrix accounting for within and between selection 
 C D 
C ሺܾ െ ܿሻሺ݊ ൅ ݉ሻ ܾ݉ െ ܿሺ݉ ൅ ݊ሻ 
D ܾ݊ 0 
 
The rationale behind this way of ag regating payoffs  as follows: for fixation of a new strategy in 
omogeneous population using the other strategy, first the game dynamics within one group (of 
ize n) have to be won and then the game dynamics between m groups have to be won. For weak 
 
g is
a h
s
selection and large m and n, the overall fixation probability is the same as the fixation probability in 
the single game using the combined matrix in table (13) and population size, mn. The stochastic 
process on two levels can be studied by a standard replicator equation using the combined matrix 
(and is work currently in progress). 
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Appendix A: Games utilized in Selten & Chmura; in this paper only games 7 to 12 (non-constant 
sum games) are investigated.  
 
 
